In “The Search for a Monetary-Policy Wizard and Political Moral Hazard”, Rubin downplays monetary policy:
In the eurozone, leaders of key troubled countries—including Italy, Spain, France and, most immediately, Greece—need to undertake structural reforms, further strengthen banking systems, and strike a fiscal balance between sufficient discipline to win market and business confidence and adequate fiscal room for growth. As to Japan, the fundamental requisite is structural reform.
In all three major advanced economies, there should be a clear-eyed view of the moral hazard created by disproportionate focus on central banks. Monetary policy should be treated with a pragmatic analysis of all its attendant risks and rewards. Instead of looking for a wizard at the end of a yellow-brick road, we should demand that elected officials take the difficult fiscal, public-investment and structural actions that could do so much good now and that are imperative for the longer term.
Does he really think he could have accomplished the “difficult fiscal actions” in his time with the low quality monetary policy of today and at the same time keep the economy growing vibrantly?