In his further comments on Stan Fischer´s presentation at the AEA meeting, Kocherlakota writes:
Why has r* fallen so much and stayed so low, despite signs of improvement in the economy? One reason is the diminished credibility of central bank objectives.
The Fed (and other central banks) have fallen short of their inflation and employment goals for many years, and are expected to do so for several more years to come. The public’s beliefs about Fed long-run capabilities and objectives are evolving in response to these misses. It should not be surprising that the Fed’s extended misses with respect to its objectives are fueling expectations of similar future extended misses – and are one factor that is pushing down on r*.
This analysis seems like yet another argument against the plan to continue to tighten monetary policy. Doing so only serves to prolong the Fed’s long undershoot with respect to inflation and (more arguably) with respect to employment. The additional erosion of credibility will create still more downward pressure on r*. (Note: r* stands for the neutral rate of interest).
To which Tony Yates responds:
On Twitter last night, commenting on Stanley Fischer’s contribution to a panel at the American Economic Association meetings in San Francisco, outgoing FOMC member Kocherlakota expressed his scepticism about the wisdom of raising the inflation target.
However, credibility worriers also need to remember [and here I don’t finger Prof Kocherlakota for failing to] that in some respects raising the inflation target may improve the credibility of monetary policy and reduce inflation uncertainty.
By persisting with the current 2 per cent target, the Fed and other central banks risk further long episodes at the zero bound, and further protracted periods in which inflation is substantially below target [in the UK headline inflation has been about 0 for a year now], and corresponding uncertainty about whether the central bank can ever regain control over inflation. If setting a higher target means reduced time at the zero bound, then it most surely means better inflation control, and enhanced ‘credibility’, in the sense of the reputation for competence and inflation forecasts that would follow from inflation turning out to be closer to the new, higher objective.
Nowhere does Kocherlakota mention a higher inflation target. That´s TY´s pet project. In any case, if the Fed does not seem to be able to hit the 2% target, how can we presume a 4% target is not only achievable but also enhances credibility!
Inflation is determined by monetary policy. If instead of associating monetary policy with interest rate policy (which becomes “ineffectual” at the ZLB) you associate monetary policy with NGDP growth relative to a stable trend path, you get nominal stability. In that case you not only avoid the ZLB but you get stable (and credible) inflation and stable RGDP growth.
Over more than 20 years prior to 2008, the Fed succeeded in obtaining nominal stability. That comes out clearly in the chart below where, particularly between 1993 and 2007 NGDP growth is quite stable (low growth dispersion). That stability (around a trend growth path) was lost in 2008 and the appropriate level path has not been regained.
Core inflation, which particularly during the 1993 – 2007 period had remained close to 2%, fluctuating due to real (productivity) shocks, since 2008 has mostly been below the 2% target.
Just like the 1970s showed that a rising NGDP growth path is inflationary, the last several years have shown that too little inflation results from too low NGDP growth (at a low trend path).
What that tells me is that it is high time to stop talking and worry about inflation and try to regain the lost nominal stability that the US economy enjoyed prior to 2008. Best way to achieve that is for the Fed to set an NGDP Level Target.