Não é exagero dizer que a Alemanha tem sido pintada como a grande vilã da crise na Europa. Esse blog (aqui) que normalmente está em alemão, nesse post coloca seu ponto de vista em inglês para maior repercursão:
To regain its competitiveness, Germany had to go through a painful and long period of wage and price moderation, while still suffering from massive unemployment. Since monetary policy was no longer an option, Germany had to follow this internal devaluation path. The trend growth of NGDP during this time was a mere 2.1%.
This long period of moderation finally started to pay off in 2006. Not only did unemployment fall to roughly 7% by the end of 2008, but Germany’s new trend of NGDP might well have been the European average of roughly 4%. As the figure above shows, German NGDP is still well below that new trend, around 7.8% in 2010 Q3. So the ECB’s monetary policy is even too tight for Germany, as Matthew Yglesias has recently suggested.
If Germans really knew how dearly they paid for the Euro even before this crisis, the reaction to various bailouts would be even less, well, enthusiastic. Germany suffered 15 years through two massive adjustment processes that it neither wanted nor chose: the Euro was forced upon it by the Allies, and the Eastern Germans damn sure did not choose to live under an economically devastating socialist regime.
Therefore, complaints from other countries that Germany is thriving at the expense of others (the US, other European countries etc.) are simply ludicrous – and likely to end: Germany’s regained competitiveness and the rising interest differential between European countries will channel more investment to its firms in the future.