Política Monetária Única e Pol. Fiscal Múltipla não dá mais…

Guido Tabellini discute alternativas (aqui):

The illusions evaporated last weekend. No one believes that fixing Ireland can prevent the “infection” from reaching Portugal and Spain. No one has convincing answers on how to stop the contagion. Uncertainty is paralysing markets and accelerating the crisis’s spread.

Before designing new policies to stop the contagion, it is necessary to review the deep fundamentals that explain the Eurozone’s situation. Each country has its problems which are somewhat different from those of its neighbours. But behind this second fall of the euro lie two common problems. The first and most fundamental is the separation between fiscal and monetary policy.

Update: Não deixe de ler na íntegra este do Barry Eichengreen (aqui):

It pains me to say this. I’m probably the most pro-euro economist on my side of the Atlantic. Not because I think the euro area is the perfect monetary union, but because I have always thought that a Europe of scores of national currencies would be even less stable. I’m also a believer in the larger European project. But given this abject failure of European and German leadership, I am going to have to rethink my position.

Update 2: Vamos “fuçando” e encontrando análises interessantes. Essa (aqui) e do Paul De Grauwe:

[apart from Greece]…the root cause of the debt problems is to be found in the unsustainable debt accumulation of the private sectors. From 1999 until 2008, when the financial crises erupted, private households in the eurozone increased their debt levels from about 50% of GDP to 70%. The explosion of bank debt in the eurozone was even more spectacular and reached more than 250% of GDP in 2008. Surprisingly, the only sector that did not experience an increase in its debt level during that period was the government sector, which saw its debt decline from 72 to 68% of GDP. Ireland and Spain, two of the countries with the severest government debt problems today, experienced the strongest declines of their government debt ratios prior to the crisis. These are also the countries where the private debt accumulation was the strongest.

Tyler Cowen tem comentários adicionais à análise de De Grauwe:

Once sovereign default is in play, De Grauwe predicts self-reinforcing downward spirals can  destroy the eurozone.  His points are well-taken, but I would add a few observations:

1. To be a small country, and to “play with matches” without good fire insurance, is also a form of fiscal irresponsibility.  It is a more important form of fiscal irresponsibility than we had thought.  A’la Robert Eisner, the government’s measured budget position is not the key magnitude for measuring its fiscal stance.  The three percent rule is partly to blame here, although a lot of countries couldn’t even follow that.

2. The distinction between private and public debt ain’t what it used to be.

3. Fiscal union was, is, and will remain a fantasy.  The best the eurozone could have done was to abolish national banking systems and have a truly European banking market.  It’s too late for even that, though.

3 thoughts on “Política Monetária Única e Pol. Fiscal Múltipla não dá mais…

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