Uma aplicação da Teoria Fiscal do Nível de Preços (FTPL) desenvolvida por Michael Woodford há mais de 10 anos (aqui):
Second, rather than quantitative easing, the optimal policy consists of a commitment to a “history-dependent” rule driven by the price level (i.e. not the rate of inflation of the consumer price index). Under that rule, the central bank commits to a given path for the level of the price index, and undertakes to make up for past inflation shortfalls (which would drive the price level below the target) by allowing future inflation to be sufficiently higher to bring prices back up towards the target path.
The motivation behind a rule like this is to bestow the central bank the ability to manage inflation expectations (and, thus, control the level of the real interest rate), even when the nominal rate is stuck at the zero bound. By raising inflation expectations, the Fed could provide stimulus by lowering real interest rates, as well as penalizing cash holders, thus forcing them to put that cash to alternative uses—consumption or investment.
Mas,
While conceptually appealing, the proposed rule is vulnerable to lack of credibility. This is because, in order to conduct policy, a central bank needs not only a rule but also a tool to implement that rule. But here, the rule and the implementation tool virtually coincide: The rule is the central bank’s intention to allow higher inflation in the future in the event of past inflation shortfalls; and the tool is simply the verbal expression of that intention.
This makes monetary policy akin to bluffing in poker: If the market buys the bluff, inflation expectations rise, real rates fall, cash gets spend, aggregate demand recovers. But why would the market buy the bluff, if, for example, it suspects that the central bank will renege on its “promise” of higher inflation in the future, and that it will “cheat” by raising interest rates once aggregate demand picks up?
In short, how can a central bank demonstrate its commitment to higher inflation, besides simply stating that this is its intention?
Resposta: Deixe claro que a sua motivação é a pura e simples monetização da dívida!
“Deixe claro que a sua motivação é a pura e simples monetização da dívida!”
O Sumner uma vez escreveu que os banqueiros centrais da época do padrão-ouro iam rolar de rir com a incapacidade do Fed de gerar inflação…
Acho que podemos dizer o mesmo dos banqueiros centrais brasileiros de antes do real.